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SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In the nine months between April 1, 1971 and January 1, 1972
the Ninth Circuit considered a great many cases in the area of selective
service law. During this period the court heard appeals from convictions in some 104 cases involving various violations of the Selective
Service Act. In addition, the court reviewed twelve habeas corpus
petitions filed by men presently in the armed forces, seeking release
from the military on various grounds.
This note will attempt to illustrate the problems faced at the appellate level by a selective service attorney in the Ninth Circuit, as
reflected by an examination of the court's decisions over this nine
month period. The discussion of the cases will also provide some
indication of the areas in which the Ninth Circuit's thinking has
changed in recent decisions, so that the attorney may be aware of the
present attitude of the court on controversial selective service law problems. In this regard, some comparison will be made on certain issues
between the Ninth Circuit's views and those of the other federal circuit
courts.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that selective service law
is more closely related to administrative law than to criminal law.
Formal compliance with statutory guidelines is the rule; variance is the
exception. For this reason, timing is critical in draft cases, and the
lawyer's approach to a particular case will vary significantly, depending
upon the state of the client's affairs when he first consults an attorney.
The Preinduction Stage: Registrant's Rights and Procedures
Available for Preserving Those Rights
Under the Military Selective Service Act,' every male citizen and
every male alien resident, who is between the ages of 18 and 26, must
register with a local draft board.2 Failure to do so is a crime, punishable by not more than 5 years imprisonment, or fine of not more than
$10,000, or both.3 Few cases now arise involving persons who sought
to evade the registration process itself. Once a young man has reg1. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73 (1970), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. App. (Supp.
1972).
2. 50 U.S.C.A. Ap. § 453 (Supp. 1972). An exception is made for any alien
lawfully admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant. Id.
3. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
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istered, he has begun his participation in the complicated and highly

fortuitous administrative maze known as the Selective Service System.
Prior to 1970, no registrant legally escaped the administrative machinery at this early stage; however, since 1970, the registrant has been
subject to a lottery drawing to determine
possible exclusion from any
4
active commitment in the armed services.

A registrant who becomes eligible for induction may well require
some contact with the draft lawyer even at this preliminary stage. In
any event, it is at this stage that the registrant must pay special attention

to the "classification system" (I-A to IV-F).-

Registrants are auto-

matically classified I-A in absence of special facts, and the registrant
would be well advised to press his claim for a special classification-

other than I-A-at the earliest possible date; if there is a timing problem or if the draft board denies the request for special status, litigation
may be necessary to resolve the controversy.

Request for a Change of Classification Made Prior to
Mailing of Notice of Induction
Duty of the Registrant: Making a Prima
Facie Case for Deferment
The registrant must present his local draft board with sufficient
evidence that he is entitled to a deferment before he has been mailed
his notice of induction, in order for the board to be required to reopen
the registrant's classification.( Upon such reopening, however, the reg4. 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1971).
"Under the revised system a 'First Priority
Selection Group' is established which will normally constitute the only group from
which men will be called involuntarily into service, other than those delinquent in
their obligations under the law, or medical, dental, and allied specialists (who are
subject to special calls after they complete their professional training.)
Those
registrants who are not selected for induction during their 12-month period of exposure
will then be placed into a lower priority category and will normally not be vulnerable
for induction except under the unlikely circumstances that the First Priority Group is
completely exhausted [sic]. Thus, under normal conditions a young man will receive an earlier and more decisive answer to his question, 'Where do I stand with the
draft?' and will be able to plan his life accordingly." SPECuL SUPPLEMENT,
SELECTIVE SERV. L. REP. 4 (Presidential Proclamation of Nov. 26, 1969).
5. The classifications are individually described at 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.10-.50
(1972).
6. The federal regulations provide: "The local board may reopen and consider
anew the classification of a registrant . . . upon the written request of the registrant
* . * if such request is accompanied by written information presenting facts not considered when the registrant was classified, which, if true, would justify a change in
the registrant's classification . . . provided . . . the classification of a registrant shall
not be reopened after the local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induction . . . or an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of
Employer . . . unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a change
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istrant is entitled to certain procedural safeguards which accompany
his classification as a registrant.7 Of prime importance is the fact
that the registrant bears the responsibility for presenting evidence to
the local board sufficient to warrant his requested deferment; 8 in fact,
the registrant's duty in this regard has been held to extend to the point
of insuring that the board has received the information sent to it.9
The Ninth Circuit has considered a number of cases in which
the primary issue was whether the evidence submitted by the registrant
was sufficient to require the board to reopen the classification. The
settled rule in these cases appears to be that the board is not required
to reopen the classification unless the registrant has presented it with
prima facie evidenct that he is entitled to a deferment. 10 In effect, the
registrant must submit evidence "which, if true, would justify a change
in the registrant's classification."" The criteria which must be met in
in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had
no control." 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1972).
7. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.11 (1972) provides that, when a board reopens the registrant's classification, he is to be treated "in the same manner as if he had never
before been classified." Section 1625.13 provides that even if the registrant is retained in the same classification, "[ejach such classification shall be followed by the
same right of appearance before the local board and the same right of appeal as in
the case of an original classification." See also Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S.
410 (1969).
8. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.1(c) (1972) provides that "[tlhe local board will receive
and consider all information, pertinent to the classification of a registrant, presented
to it." (emphasis added). However, a registrant who is found to be not currently
qualified for service under applicable physical standards is to be automatically classified I-Y. Compare 32 C.F.R. § 1622.17 (1972), with United States v. Baray, 445
F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1971). See United States v. Kohls, 441 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971),
where a registrant's form had been stamped at the examining station with this notation: "Induction is held in abeyance, not presently acceptable for induction." Id.
at 1078. The court held that this implied that Kohl's acceptability had not yet been
finally determined, and thus the board had not erred in failing to classify him I-Y.
9. United States v. Boswell, 446 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1971). In Boswell the
registrant had asked his board for the required conscientious objector form (labeled
S.S.S. Form 150).
The board denied him the right to receive it in person and
mailed it to him instead. When the registrant returned the form through the mails, it
was lost and the board never received it. Boswell relied on United States v. Williams,
317 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1970), which held that the board was under a duty to see
why the registrant had not returned the form. 317 F. Supp. at 1371-72. The Ninth
Circuit expressly refused to approve or disapprove the Williams decision. 446 F.2d
at 471 n.3. Rather the court distinguished Williams on the ground that the registrant
in that case had previously stated unequivocally that he was a conscientious objector,
while Boswell had merely requested an "objector form." Id. at 471 n.2. The court
also rejected Boswell's argument that the board should bear the risk of loss since it
had chosen the method of communication. Id. at 471.
10. E.g., United States v. O'Neal, 443 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
11. United States v. Thomas, 442 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1971), quoting
32 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1971).
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order to qualify for a particular deferment are set forth in the Code of
Federal Regulations. 12
Student Deferments
Prior to the 1971 revisions to the draft law, 13 the two types of
deferments which were traditionally at issue in selective service litigation were those on behalf of students and conscientious objectors. Although student deferments are no longer granted, deferments in existence during the calendar year 1970-1971 are being allowed to continue -under certain prescribed circumstances. 4 Because of the large
number of previously issued student deferments, and because of the
administrative delay in reviewing cases that arose prior to 1971, cases
involving student deferments continue to represent a large part of the
Ninth Circuit's caseload and will be briefly reviewed below. Ordinarily,
a registrant desiring a student deferment, under the pre-1971 rules,
needed only to present his board with the required form from his
school, stating that he was indeed a full-time student.' 5 The status of
full-time student was accorded to one who was "satisfactorily pursuing
a full-time course of instruction" at the college level.'
In the recent case of United States v. Bray"7 the Ninth Circuit
12. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.10-.50 (1972) describe the requirements for each
classification. Prima facie evidence that a registrant is entitled to an occupational
deferment must include a showing that the registrant is irreplacable in his employment. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.23(a)(2) (1972). The nature of the requirement seems to
demand the statement from the employer that the registrant cannot be replaced.
See United States v. Hoffman, 444 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Farrell,
443 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1971). The registrant seeking a hardship deferment must
show that his induction would result in extreme hardship for his family. 32 C.F.R.
§ 1622.30(a) (1972): United States v. Preston, 445 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1971).
13. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451-73 (Supp. 1972).
14. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25(a) (1972): "In Class 2-S shall be placed any registrant who requests such classification, who was satisfactorily pursuing a full-time
course of instruction at a college, university, or similar institution of learning during
the 1970-1971 regular academic school year and who is satisfactorily pursuing such
course, such classification to continue until such registrant completes the requirement
for his baccalaureate degree, fails to pursue satisfactorily full-time course of instruction, or attains the twenty-fourth anniversary of the date of his birth, whichever
occurs first."
15. Selective Service Form 109. 32 Fed. Reg. 9790 (1967), as amended, 32
C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1972); 35 Fed. Reg. 12274 (1970), as amended, 32 C.F.R.
§ 1622.26 (1972), described previous I-S and H-S student deferments. The limited
form of present 11-S deferment is described in 32 C.F.R. 1622.25(a) (1972).
See note 13 supra. Technically, a registrant himself was also required to submit a
written request for a student deferment. United States v. Farrell, 443 F.2d 355, 356
(9th Cir. 1971).
16, 32 Fed. Reg. 9790 (1967), as amended, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1972).
17. 445 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1971).
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further defined the criteria for student eligibility and held that, for
selective service purposes, a registrant's pursuit of a course of instruction "is deemed to commence with enrollment."'" Registrant Bray had
not attended school during the winter quarter, but he was enrolled for
the forthcoming spring quarter which was to commence on March 28.
On February 21, the registrar of the school mailed the required student
deferment form to the board; however, the board refused to classify
the registrant as a student. The Ninth Circuit held this to be error:
Bray had in good faith enrolled in a full-time course of study at a
college .... The college had accepted Bray's enrollment, and Bray
had paid his tuition fees .... Under these circumstances, we think
that Bray . . . was "satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of
instruction" even though his classes had not yet started. 19
In a later case,20 however, the court failed to extend the Bray decision
to those who have completed enrollment, and held that mere acceptance
for admission was insufficient to require the board to grant a student
deferment.
The regulations provided that a registrant is not entitled to a student
deferment if he is not "satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction."'" The effect of this requirement was clearly illustrated in
a rather severe decision by the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Olson. "
In Olson a registrant lost 11/2 units of credit because he had transferred from one junior college to another. Because of this loss of
credit, the registrant did not have the number of credits normally acquired at the end of two years of college. The local draft board ruled
that because Olson lacked the requisite number of units, he was not
entitled to a student deferment and he was classified I-A. Olson challenged this classification, asserting that the board's action violated a
local board memorandum which provided as follows:
When a registratnt transfers from a junior college or community college to a degree granting institution, and loses credits through no
fault of his own, he may have less than the percent of course completion required . . . . The local board may, in its discretion,
23
grant a II-S deferment for the first year after transfer ....
The Ninth Circuit held that the cited memorandum was inapplicable
to the circumstances of this particular case, and was, instead, limited
18.

Id. at 821.

19.

445 F.2d at 821.

20.

United States v. Gasca, 449 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1971).

In Gasca the

court held that the registrant had not yet begun "pursuing a full-time course of instruction" even though he had been accepted for admission to a college but was still
in the process of completing his registration.
21. 32 Fed. Reg. 9790 (1967), as amended, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1972).
22. 447 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971).
23. Local Board Memorandum No. 43(3) (1968), quoted in 447 F.2d at 1364.
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in scope only to those persons who lost units on transfer from a junior
college to a four year college. The court further noted that even had
the memorandum been applicable, by its express terms, the granting
of relief was discretionary with the board, and moreover, the registrant
had failed to show (as was required under the memorandum) that he
had not been at fault for the loss of the units.
In a similar case, United States v. Jenson,2 4 the Ninth Circuit expanded on its explanation of the student deferment requirements. Jenson had been convicted for failing to report for induction, and he had
based his defense of deferment upon his certification by the school as
a full-time student. The appellate court, in affirming the conviction,
stated that school certification alone was not sufficient to merit deferment. The court noted that while the local board necessarily relies
heavily on information furnished by the school,
the board is not bound by the school's conclusion that a registrant is satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction.
Whether the registrant meets the requirements of the Act and regulations must be determined ultimately by the board itself.25
Conscientious Objectors
Even though student deferments have now been discontinued,
and the amount of litigation involving student status may soon taper
off, no such change appears imminent in the area of selective service
law requiring conscientious objectors. Within the last decade, the definition of a "conscientious objector" has been broadened greatly through
determinations of the United States Supreme Court.2" Consonant with
the underlying attitude of the Court in these decisions, Congress has
also declared that no registrant will be required to serve in the armed
27
services if such activity would violate his fundamental beliefs.
A procedural format to determine conscientious objector status
has been developed. The registrant who feels that he is qualified for
24. 450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 1262.
26. For a short history see Comment, Selective Service System-Scope of the
Conscientious Objector Exemption After Welsh v. United States, 19 KAN. L. Rv.
231 (1971).
27. 50 U.S.C.A. Apr. § 4566) (Supp. 1972). "In Class I-A-O shall be placed
every registrant who would have been classified in Class I-A but for the fact that he
has been found, by reason of religious training and belief, to be conscientiously opposed to combatant training and service in the armed forces". 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11
(1972). "In Class I-0 shall be placed every registrant who would have been classified
in Class I-A but for the fact that he has been found to be conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form and to be conscientiously opposed to participation
in both combatant and noncombatant training and service in the armed forces." 32
C.F.R. § 1622.14 (1972). Those who are classified 1-0 may be required to perform
alternative service in a civilian capacity. See 32 C.F.R. § 1622.16 (1972).
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such status, must inform his local board. In turn, the board must
send the registrant the appropriate form,2" which the registrant must
then complete and return. On the form, the registrant is to indicate
that he seeks conscientious objector status, and is to specify his reasons therefor. Whether or not the registrant has presented a prima
facie case for conscientious objector status is regarded by the courts
as a question of fact; however, rarely does the court find the informa29
tion supplied by a registrant insufficient to present a prima facie case.
That is, the sufficiency of the statements on the form itself is not
generally the basis of selective service litigation in cases involving conscientious objectors. However, in a recent Ninth Circuit case, United
States v. Zaragoza,3 0 the draft board rejected the registrant's claim for
conscientious objector status because he had merely referred to the
Scriptures in the area on the form where he was requested to describe
the nature of his belief. The Ninth Circuit noted that the registrant
was a high school drop-out and possessed only a limited command of
English. Moreover, he had indicated in other areas of the form his
opposition to war and to participation in combatant or noncombatant
service, as well as his willingness to perform civilian alternate service. 31
The registrant had written that "Christians are to love their enemies"
2
and cited or alluded to other Biblical passages proscribing killing.
Summarizing all of the material included on Zaragoza's form the court
concluded:
In light of the affirmations of belief set out above, we hold that
Zaragoza presented a prima facie claim of conscientious objection based on his own beliefs, not a mere parroting of scripture
and church doctrine. A contrary interpretation would be nitpicking and would unfairly discriminate against 33
the unlearned and inarticulate in favor of the educated and fluent.
28. Selective Service Form 150. The court has held that the board is not required to interpret a letter from the registrant denouncing the draft system as a request for conscientious objector status; and failure to send Form 150 under such circumstances was not error. United States v. Wendt, 452 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1971).
29. The registrant need only state that he is, by reason of religious training and
belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. 50 U.S.C.A. APP.
§ 456(j) (Supp. 1972). The religious belief need not be conventional. "The test might
be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of
its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying
for the exemption comes within the statutory defintion." United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). However, a registrant must be opposed to participating in
all wars and cannot be selective. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
30. 449 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 1279.
32. Id. He claimed to have been a lifelong member of the "Church of GodSeventh Day.'
33. Id. at 1280.
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The selective service regulations also provide that a registrant
must be placed in the lowest class for which he is determined to be

eligible.8 4 Often a registrant's request for conscientious objector status
is not acted upon immediately because the board has already assigned

him to a lower classification, pursuant to these regulations. An excellent illustration of the interplay between the rules relating to conscientious objector status and those stemming from the aforementioned
regulation appears in the case of United States v. Ward.38 In Ward
the registrant had filed the required form for conscientious objector

status even though at the time he possessed a student deferment (I-S).
The board determined that the registrant was a conscientious objector
and thus qualified for noncombatant service. The board issued the
I-A-O classification to the registrant as he had requested and subsequently issued an induction notice. The registrant failed to appear for
induction and upon conviction appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The
court held that the registrant should have been continued at the level
of I-S, since that was a lower classification than I-A-O; the fact that
the registrant had filed the required form for conscientious objector

status did not necessarily mean he was requesting such a classification

immediately.3 6

Since the registrant had been entitled to deferment

at the lower classification, his conviction for failure to report for ser7
vice was reversed.
34. 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1972) which provides: "Every registrant shall be
placed in Class I-A under the provisions of section 1622.10 of this chapter except
that when grounds are established to place a registrant in one or more of the classes
listed in the following table, the registrant shall be classified in the lowest class for
which he is determined to be eligible, with Class I-A-O considered the highest class
and Class I-C considered the lowest class according to the following table:
Class: I-A-0
Class: IV-B
I-0
IV-C

I-S
I-Y

IV-D
IV-F

11-A
IV-A
11-C
V-A
31-S
I-W
I-D
I-C
rn-A
35. 445 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1971).
36. It was possible that the registrant simply filed the form to supply evidence
that would substantiate a later conscientious objector claim, evidence indicating at what
time the registrants beliefs crystallized. The Ninth Circuit in another case expressly
refrained from deciding whether or not a registrant can waive his student deferment
in order to get his board's ruling and an appeal on a request for conscientious objector
status. United States v. Kohls, 441 F.2d 1076, 1077 n.1 (9th Cir. 1971).
37. 445 F.2d at 263. At first glance it would appear the court did not adhere
to this decision in United States v. Draper, 449 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1971). In that
case, the registrant was classified 1-0, a conscientious objector; and he began to per-
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In summary it should be noted that a draft board is not an investigatory agency. The registrant bears the burden of providing any
information to the draft board which might have a bearing on his
classification. It is relatively easy for a registrant to require the board
to reopen his classification. All he need do is establish a prima facie
case for a determent, and the requirements therefor are clearly set out
in the regulations.Y Regardless of the type of deferment sought by
the registrant these basic principles apply.
Request for a Change of Classification Made
After Induction Notice Has Been Mailed
Many registrant's do not challenge their I-A classification or seek
advice until after they have received a notice of induction. This delay
can be fatal because of a selective service regulation 39 which provides
that after a board has mailed a notice of induction to a registrant, he
is not entitled to a different classification unless he can show that his
change in status was due to "circumstances beyond his control"."0 In
a series of cases this regulation has consistently withstood constitutional
attack.4 1
In dealing with this particular regulation, it is crucial to note that
its severe consequences flow from the date an induction notice is
mailed to the registrant and not from the date of actual receipt.42
Once an induction notice has been mailed, the registrant is placed
under a demanding burden-he must present evidence not only that
form his alternate service in October, 1966.
In November, 1966 he was fired.
In April, 1967 he was accepted by VISTA and served until May, 1968. At his trial
for failure to perform alternate service, he contended that he was entitled to a II-A,
occupational deferment, classification during the time he was in VISTA and that the
board erred by retaining him in the 1-0 classification, since a II-A is lower (see note
34 infra). The court pointed out that the board could not change Draper's classification once he had received his order to report for alternate service (see notes 39-60 and
accompanying text infra) so it was correct in continuing his 1-0 classification.
449 F.2d 807, 811 (9th Cir. 1971).
38. See note 5 supra.
39. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1972), quoted at note 6 supra.
40. Id.

41. United States v. Simon, 448 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Stacey, 441 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Taggart, 441 F.2d 727 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Hardman, 439 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1971).
42. United States v. Bloom, 444 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1971). The registrant in
Bloom claimed that his initial conference with an attorney took place on June 19 and
that, because of this conference, he realized for the first time that he was eligible
for conscientious objector status. On June 20 he filed the required form with his form.
Soon thereafter he received his induction notice. The court held that his claim was
subject to 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2, since it had not been filed before June 19, the date
his induction notice was mailed. 444 F.2d at 1400.
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there exists a prima facie right to a different classification, but also that
this right resulted from a change in status caused by circumstances beyond his control.
A good illustration of the effect of this provision is offered by
The registrant in Stacey
the recent case of United States v. Stacey."
was mailed the induction order on November 5. He wrote the board
a letter two days later, stating that he worked for the post office and
would like a ninety-day postponement because of the Christmas rush.
He argued that the board erred in not considering his letter as a request for an occupational deferment. The court rejected this argument, saying that:
[I]n addition to presenting a prima facie case with respect to the
requested classification, the registrant must also present a prima
facie case of changed circumstances . . . . In order to meet
the requirements of 1625.2, the registrant must set out facts
showing a change in status between November 5, 1969 (the date
the induction order
44 was mailed) and November 7, 1969 (the
date of the letter).
The Ninth Circuit has not recently considered any cases in which
the factual situation demonstrated a change in status caused by circumstances beyond the registrant's control. Nevertheless, litigation in this
area has been extensive. Most of the cases which involve this issue
are brought by conscientious objectors, and Ehlert v. United States,4 5
recently decided by the Supreme Court, can be expected to have a
significant impact. In Ehlert the registrant had made no claim for
conscientious objector status until after he had received his induction
notice. He asked the board to be allowed to present his claim, stating
that his beliefs had matured only after the induction notice had made
immediate the prospect of military service. The board refused to reopen his classification and the registrant declined to submit to induction.
The district court held that the ripening of Ehlert's conscientious
objector views was not a circumstance beyond his control and found
the defendant guilty of violating the Selective Service Act. The district court decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.4 6 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision
43. 441 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1971).
44. Id. at 510.
45. 402 U.S. 99 (1971).
46. 422 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1970). Several circuits had taken the opposite
view. United States v. Geary, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966); Scott v. Commanding
Officer, 431 F. 1132 (3rd Cir. 1970); United States v. Nordlof, 440 F.2d 840 (7th
Cir. 1971); Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v.
Stoppelman, 406 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1969) (dictum). For an indication of the type
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was affirmed, and the Court squarely held that crystallization of conscientious objector beliefs is not a circumstance beyond a registrant's
control under the regulations,4 7 and that the board was thus correct in
not reopening the registrant's classification.
Because of the decision in Ehlert, contentions by registrants that
a board must consider a late arising conscientious objector claim are
now rejected with little or no comment."' However, recent cases 49
have indicated that, under limited conditions, a remedy may still be
available to these registrants. In one of these cases, United States v.
Lopez, 50 the Ninth Circuit focused on an army regulation which had
been issued just prior to Ehlert. This particular regulation extended
the in-service hearings which were provided for servicemen who purported conscientious objector beliefs, to servicemen whose beliefs crystallized prior to induction but after mailing of induction notice.5 ' The
court in Lopez considered the effect of this regulation upon a registrant who had (1) filed a claim for conscientious objector status after
he had received his induction notice and (2) who had refused inducof argument that might be expected in these circuits see United States v. Ferber,
451 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1971), discussed at note 55 infra.
47. The Ninth Circuit has described the dilemma that faces a registrant who
files a request for conscientious objector status after he has received his induction notice: "If appellant's claim of being a conscientious objector was because of his beliefs
prior to receiving the notice of induction, his late filing of a previously matured
conscientious objector belief does not permit the opening of a prior classification ...
On the other hand, if appellant's conscientious objector beliefs matured after the
notice of induction was issued, the local board would be governed by 32 C.F.R. 1625.2.
."
United States v. Lopez, 442 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir. 1971). In this latter
event, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, Ehiert would prevent the board from considering
the claim, since the late crystalization is not a change caused by circumstances beyond
a registrant's control.
48. United States v. Miller, 451 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Stupke, 451 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Simon, 448 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Olsten, 447 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. White,
447 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Alvarado, 444 F.2d 255 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Bloom, 444 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bossi,
444 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hoffman, 44 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Berry, 443 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Farrell,
443 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hand, 443 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Wilkinson, 443 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lopez,
442 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. McNeill, 442 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Nadeau, 442 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Henk,
441 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Roy, 441 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Ruggeri, 441 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stacey,
441 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Sayers, 440 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Hoffman, 439 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1971).
49. United States v. Miller, 451 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Lopez, 451 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1971).
50. 451 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1971).
51. See Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 107 (1971).
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tion prior to the Ehlert decision. At the time the registrant in Lopez
had refused induction, the army regulations provided a procedure for

an inductee to apply for conscientious objector status only if his beliefs
had crystallized after induction, and the registrant had been convicted
for refusal to submit to induction. The conviction was affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 2 The registrant then petitioned
the appellate court for modification of his sentence, and requested that
he be allowed to be inducted into the army in order that his conscientious objector claim might be pursued through military channels

under the new Army regulations. The Ninth Circuit stated that, while
it does not normally order a lower tribunal to modify a sentence which
does not exceed statutory limits,
it would be in the interests of justice for the district court to hold a
hearing in order to determine whether this appellant, at the time
set for his induction in 1970, refused induction solely because he
believed in good faith that he would not be afforded as in-service
forum in which to make his conscientious objector claim. 58

It appears, then, that if the registrant fails to report for induction because of the nonexistence of adequate relief, the registrant might be
entitled to request induction and an in-service hearing, in lieu of con-

viction for refusing induction. However, the court noted that the relief requested would be futile if the army would not accept the registrant for induction.5 4
Several recent Ninth Circuit cases have concentrated on the issue
of what is required to constitute a "change caused by circumstances
beyond a registrant's control." 55 The registrant's becoming a student
is not such a change, since it is clearly within the registrant's control. 56
52. United States v. Lopez, 442 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1971).
53. 451 F.2d at 1313.
54. It is questionable that the army would be willing to induct the registrant
simply. to provide him with a forum in which to express his conscientious objector
beliefs. If the registrant proved that his beliefs crystallized after he received his
induction notice, and that in refusing induction he relied on the situation as it existed
before Ehlert, the army might be depriving the registrant of his right to a forum.
Cf. Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971).
55. An interesting argument involving circumstances beyond a registrants
control was presented in United States v. Ferber, 451 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1971).
The registrant did not ask for conscientious objector status until he had already received his notice of induction, however, he claimed that he did not realize that a
conscientious objector claim could be based on nonreligious beliefs until after the United
States Supreme Court bad decided Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
This, he argued, was a change in status caused by circumstances beyond his control and
thus, the board should have considered his late-filed conscientious objector claim.
The court did not reach the merits of this argument, however, because it held that
the registrant had presented a prima facie case for conscientious objector status even
under pre-Welsh standards.
56. United States v. Wilkinson, 443 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Nor is doing field service for the Jehovah's Witnesses a change caused
by uncontrollable circumstances," nor volunteering to work with
VISTA, 58 nor the acquisition of a dependent, 59 nor learning of paternity
60
or a spouse's pregnancy.
Often at issue when a deferment is denied under a request for
reopening the registrant's classification, on the basis of changed circumstances, is the question whether the local board actually reopened
the registrant's classification and considered his request on the merits." 1
Hall v. Richards, 2 a recent case, illustrates the importance of showing
that the local board did in fact reopen the registrant's classification
and consider the claim on its merits in rejecting the requested deferment. In Hall the registrant had originally requested an occupational
deferment which was denied. Subsequently, the registrant notified the
draft board of his wife's pregnancy; however, the request for a dependency deferment was made after he had received an induction notice. Ordinarily, under these circumstances, the board would thus not
have been required to consider the claim. The court found, however,
that there had been a de facto reopening of the registrant's classification
by the draft board and since the registrant had presented prima facie
evidence of dependency status, the board had erred in denying the
requested deferment; the registrant was subsequently released from the
service. The Hall case may be considered as somewhat exceptional,
since it is rare that a registrant is able to prove that his classification
was reopened. The reason for this difficulty is that the court narrowly
construes the term "reopened." 6
The fact that the board has "con57. United States v. Berry, 443 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1971).
58. United States v. Draper, 449 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1971).
59. United States v. Falzer, 452 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Jenson, 450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Longo, 445 F.2d 305 (9th
Cir. 1971).
60. United States v. Jenson, 450 F.2d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Dell'Anno, 436 F.2d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 1971). In Jenson the woman with whom
registrant had been living had become pregnant after he had received his induction
order. The court denied his right to reclassification since "premarital conception is
the result of consensual conduct and thus not a 'circumstance over which the registrant
has no control' within the meaning of § 1625.2." 450 F.2d at 1264. Dell'Anno
involved a situation in which both marriage and pregnancy occurred subsequent to
the registrant's receipt of his induction order.
61. United States v. Stupke, 451 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1971); Hall v. Richards,
447 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. White, 447 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1971);
Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Alvarado,
444 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hand, 443 F.2d 826 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. O'Neal, 443 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971).
62. 447 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1971).
63. Granting the registrant a "courtesy interview" does not constitute reopen-

ing. United States v. O'Neal, 443 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971). In United States v.
White, 447 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1971), a registrant had twice failed to report for
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sidered" a registrant's claim does not, by itself, mean there has been

a "reopening." As has been stated by the court, "the local board must
give some consideration to his showing before it can determine wheth-

er it amounts to 'circumstances beyond his control.' ",a
To summarize, the crucial preliminary fact, to be determined by
an attorney is when did the registrant, who claims wrongful denial of
deferment, actually submit his request to the draftboard. If the registrant delayed his request for a deferment .until after an induction
notice was mailed to him, then the attorney must be prepared to present (1) prima facie evidence that his client was entitled to the deferment and (2) prima facie evidence that his client's change in status

was the result of circumstances beyond his control.

The only excep-

tion to these requirements is the rare case-as in Hall-where a local
board has wrongfully reopened a registrant's classification and erroneously denied the deferment on its merits.
Postinduction Challenges to the Service's

Right to Detain an Inductee
Postinduction challenges to military service by registrants generally
are made by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,6 5 and such challenges were the source of extensive litigation in 1971. Of special importance in this area are cases in which the following reasons were
advanced as requiring release of the petitioner from military service:
(1) the local board erred for ever having drafted the petitioner; 66

(2) conscientious objector beliefs acquired while in the military have
subsequently rendered the petitioner eligible for release.
induction. On May 22, the board sent him another order to report. On June 2, he
completed and filed the required form for conscientious objector status. He then reported on June 10, but refused to submit to induction. On July 24, the United States
Attorney asked the board to review the conscientious objector claim. It did so and
also granted the registrant an interview. The registrant claimed that all this added up
to a de facto reopening of his classification. The court disagreed. In so doing, it
distinguished the case of United States v. Miller, 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967), where
(1) the state director had expressly authorized the board to reopen (contrasted
with the United States Attorney's "request" that the board review) and (2) the authorization was given before the registrant failed to report.
64. United States v. Alvarado, 444 F.2d 255, 256 (9th Cir. 1971).
65. "Habeas corpus is the accepted vehicle for testing the legality of retention
(custody) of servicemen in the military." Bratcher v. McNamara, 448 F.2d 222, 225
(9th Cir. 1971). Although habeas corpus review is available to challenge a refusal
of the service to classify a conscientious objector for noncombatant work, it is not
available to attack assignment to any given noncombatant job. Glazier v. Hackel,
440 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1971).
66. See Hall v. Richards, 447 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1971); Andre v. Resor, 443
F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1971).
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The first step in obtaining release after induction is to file the
petition with a court competent to hear and decide the case. In order
for the court to have the power to grant the requested relief, the serviceman must be in custody within the jurisdiction of the court and
his custodian, an officer who has control over the activities of the petitioner, must also be physically present within the same jurisdiction."'
The court has held that the latter requirement has not been fulfilled
merely by service upon the commanding officer of the base where the
serviceman is stationed, even though the base itself is within jurisdic-

tion of the court."

As a matter of procedure, the Ninth Circuit has

decided that the serviceman and his custodian will be deemed to have
been "within the jurisdiction of the court" if they were physically present on the date the action was filed.6 9 In a recent case7" the Ninth
Circuit held that the requisite jurisdiction was not lost merely because
the petitioner was subject to pending court martial charges. The court
explained that "legal issues traditionally determined by habeas corpus
for the
proceedings are not barred merely because a favorable holding
1
petitioner would not actually result in his release from custody."'
The most frequent use of habeas corpus proceedings has been by
servicemen attempting to obtain release from military service on the
basis of their conscientious objector beliefs. The service has been besieged recently with applications for discharge on conscientious objector grounds. To minimize the administrative difficulties caused by
processing these numerous requests, each branch of the military has
67. Strait v. Laird, 445 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1971). "Even if we concede that
Appellant is in custody within the jurisdiction of the District Court .. .his custodian
-the commander of the Reserve Component's Personnel Center at Fort Benjamin
Harrison-remains outside the jurisdiction of that court." Id. at 844.
68. Dillon v. Chandler, 452 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1971). In Dillon the serviceman had been ordered to report to California, for ultimate shipment to Vietnam.
His application for discharge as a conscientious objector, filed earlier in Oklahoma,
had been denied. Therefore, he filed an action for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Eastern District of California. The Commanding Officer of Travis Air Force Base,
one of the named adversary parties, was the only defendant then present in California.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, it was held that the lower tribunal lacked jurisdiction since the serviceman's custodian was not present. The one defendant located in
the jurisdiction did not qualify, since his "sole obligation to the Army [was] to provide and maintain aircraft and terminal facilities for the launching and receiving of
passenger-carrying flights bearing Army personnel. Army personnel [were] not within
his custody or control or subject to his order." Id. at 1082.
69. Smith v. Cambell, 450 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1971). A serviceman and his
commanding officer were within the territorial limits of the district court at the time
the petition was filed, but when the court issued an order to show cause both the
serviceman and his commanding officer had been transferred to Australia. The district court had jurisdiction since jurisdiction is determined as of the date of filing.
70. Bratcher v. McNamara, 448 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1971).
71. Id. at 225.
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been given the authority to promulgate its own guidelines. One of the
army regulations, 72 which required that the application for discharge
as a conscientious objector be filed only with the permanent duty station of the soldier, was recently challenged on constitutional grounds
in Turpin v. Resor.73 The Ninth Circuit upheld the regulation, and
noted that it was "dealing with a voluntary program initiated by the
armed forces,"7 4 and because the army had devised the program merely
to facilitate its procedures, the petitioner had to follow the guidelines
explicitly if he sought to come within them. The court asserted that
"[t]here is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the armed
forces provide a procedure for release of servicemen whose conscien'
However,
tious objections crystallized after they were inducted. 75
even though such a procedure is not required, all branches of the
armed forces have, in fact, developed such procedures. 76 Generally,
the serviceman is required to submit an application with detailed information regarding his beliefs; he then undergoes separate interviews
with a chaplain, then a doctor, and finally an officer other than his
commanding officer. On the basis of the information compiled from
the application and the interviews, the commanding officer makes the
final determination as to whether or not the serviceman should be discharged. Under this procedure, the officer's decision is based essentially upon the same considerations utilized by a draft board in determining a registrant's right to conscientious objector status.
Although the serviceman is provided with a hearing in the service
if his beliefs crystallized after he received his induction notice, he is
not entitled to such a hearing if his beliefs crystallized prior to the
mailing of his induction notice.77 In Morrison v. Larsen78 the serviceman had first expressed his conscientious objector beliefs in a personal
appearance before the board when he had requested a student deferment. When told by the draft board that his beliefs were immaterial
72. Army Reg. 635-20(6) (1970).
73. 452 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1971).
74. Id. at 241.
75. Id. Language such as this would appear to be contrary in principle to
United States Supreme Court cases such as Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971),
where the court expressed concern over the possibility that anyone who raises a timely
conscientious objector claim might be deprived of a forum.
76. Air Force Reg. 35-24 (1970); Army Reg. 635-20 (1970); Army Reg.
135-25 (1970); Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual 1860120 (1971): Marine Corps
Order 1306.16B (1969). Although Army Reg. 635-20 mentions only the possibility of
granting the applicant a 1-0, the court has upheld a decision to grant the applicant
a I-A-O (so that he must remain in the army in a noncombatant role). Bratcher v.
McNamara, 448 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1971).
77. Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1971); see Ames v. Laird,
450 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1971).
78. 446 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1971).
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insofar as a student deferment was concerned the serviceman withdrew
his written statement of his beliefs, and did not assert his beliefs again
until after he had received his induction notice, at which time he filed
the required conscientious objector form. After various administrative
proceedings with the Selective Service System were unsuccessful, the
serviceman had submitted to induction, as ordered by the draft board.
After six months of training in the army, the serviceman requested that
he be released from active service because of conscientious objector beliefs. The request was denied by the army on the basis that the purported beliefs had matured before the serviceman had received his induction notice. The district court found that the serviceman's beliefs
crystallized only after he had been inducted, and since a late crystallization of beliefs was involved rather than a late filing, he was entitled
to a hearing by the service. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating as
follows:
It is, of course, possible that the bases and beliefs supporting a
C.O. claim will change significantly over a period of time as the
result of reading, dialogue with others, continued introspection,
and the influence of life's experiences. For example, a C.O. claim
that was correctly diagnosed as insincere during selective service proceedings may subsequently become sincere as the result of
traumatizing experiences in the military. Also, a registrant may
have thoughts and views that have not crystallized. But once sincerely held views have crystallized, he is a conscientious objector.
Further experience may strengthen or weaken these beliefs. There
should be no half-and-half standard. The Selective Service Boards,
the courts, and the miliary [sic] in various situations, have the obligation to determine whether at a certain time, views
and beliefs of
79
a C.O. nature have crystallized or become fixed.
One final consideration pointed out by the court in Morrison and
other cases is the limited scope of judicial review of essentially administrative determinations by branches of the service. As the court explained, "[our review of military determinations is said to be 'the
narrowest known to the law'

.

.

. We are limited to a determination of

whether there is a basis in fact in the record for the military determination." '
In effect, the judiciary will restrict its review to the record
and will uphold the service's decision not to grant conscientious objector status upon even a minimal evidentiary showing. Of course,
there must be some basis in fact for the service's determination that the
79. Id. at 254-55. Also it is at least arguable that a serviceman is not entitled to an in-service hearing even though his beliefs did not crystallize until after
he received his induction notice if his local board-in violation of 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2reopened his file and considered his conscientious objector claim on its merits. Id.
at 252 n.2.
80. Id. at 253.
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serviceman is not entitled to a hearing,"1 or for the denial of conscientious objector status," and the court will evaluate the facts of
each individual situation brought before it.83
In summary, a writ of habeas corpus is the proper method to be
utilized to challenge the right of the military to retain a serviceman.
When the serviceman seeks release from the armed services, either on
the basis that he initially should not have been drafted or because he
has developed post-induction notice conscientious objector beliefs, the
court bases its decision on principles of the Selective Service law.
There are two prerequisites, however, which must be met to give the
court jurisdiction: first, the serviceman must be held in custody within
the jurisdiction of the court, and secondly, his official military custodian must be physically present within the jurisdiction of the court.
A serviceman is entitled to an in-service hearing as to whether he

qualifies for conscientious objector status only if his beliefs crystallized
after his induction notice was mailed. If his beliefs crystallized prior
to the mailing of the induction notice, he is not entitled to such a hearing by the service. The court will review the service's decision as to

whether conscientious objector status should be granted, but only to
the extent of determining if there was a basis in fact in the record for
the decision.

Possible Defenses to Selective Service Act Violations
Ordinarily, a registrant cannot obtain preinduction judicial review
of the actions of his local board.8 However, in two particular situa81. Ames v. Laird, 450 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1971); Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d
250 (9th Cir. 1971).
82. Pinkus v. Pearson, 449 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1971); Frey v. Larsen, 448
F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1971); Clement v. Laird, 447 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1971); Rastin
v. Laird, 445 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1971). In Rastin the Chief of Naval Personnel
denied a conscientious objector application primarily upon the ground that the brevity
of the asseted beliefs prevented the conclusion that Rastin's conviction was deeply
held. The court noted that none of the three officers who interviewed Rastin determined that he lacked sincerity and held that, under such circumstances, the brevity
of the application did not constitute a basis in fact for a finding that the conviction
was not deeply held.
83. In Tressan v. Laird, 454 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1972), the court expressly
held that failure to request conscientious objector status until assignment to Vietnam did not alone constitute a basis in fact for a determination of insincerity.
In Frey v. Larsen, 448 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1971), the court had bypassed this question
because there was other evidence which formed a basis in fact.
84. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1972). But see Oesteriech v. SelecIn Oestereich a Wyoming draft board
tive Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
revoked the deferment of a divinity student for having returned his registration certificate to the government, presumably as an expression of his opposition to the war
in Vietnam. The Supreme Court reversed, saying that under the circumstances,
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tions, a review of the board's preinduction actions is available: first,
the court will review the board's preinduction actions if the registrant
is facing criminal prosecution for violating the Selective Service Act;
second, such review will be allowed in a habeas corpus proceeding instigated by the registrant after induction, in which he challenges the
legality of his confinement in military service. Thus, in the vast majority of cases in order for a registrant to obtain judicial review of the
draft board's preinduction actions he must either risk criminal imprisonment or submit to induction and attempt to obtain a release later.
Because the latter alternative necessitates entry into the service for some
period of time, and because likelihood of discharge on habeas corpus
is remote, registrants have caused the criminal court to become the
focal point for most challenges to preinduction actions by the draft
board.
Because the criminal aspects of selective service law are significant
in this context the existence and scope of various defenses which may
be available to the registrant is worth reviewing. The defenses utilized
by persons who resisted induction during the nine month period of
April 1971 to December 1971 covered a broad range. In certain
cases, the constitutionality of the selective service system itself was challenged-without success. s5 In most of the cases, emphasis was given
to showing errors in classification, errors arising after classification, or
showing lack of willfulness on the part of the registrant in violating
the provisions of the Selective Service Act.
The Ninth Circuit has, in recent cases, summarily rejected conpreinduction review was not precluded by 50 United States Code Appendix section
460(b) (3). "To withhold pre-induction review in this case would . . . deprive petitioner of his liberty without the prior opportunity to present to any competent
forum-agency or court-his substantial claim that he was ordered inducted pursuant
to an unlawful procedure." 393 U.S. at 243. Justices Stewart, Brennan and White
dissented in Oestereich on the traditional ground that the action, taken before the
exhaustion of all available administrative remedies, was "plainly premature." Id. at
246. The dissent pointed out that the Congress, in enacting 50 United States Code
Appendix section 460(b)(3), had specifically disapproved of Wolff v. Selective
Service Local Bd., 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967), and other decisions that had engrafted exceptions to the rule that no preinduction judicial review of board rulings
was available. 393 U.S. at 247-48; see H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong. 1st Sess.
30-31 (1967); S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967). The Ninth Circuit
did not review a case involving this issue during the nine months with which this note
is concerned.
85. United States v. Lumsden, 449 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Bums, 446 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Thomason, 444 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Farrell, 443 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Thompson, 443 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gidmark, 440 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1971).
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tentions that the Act constitutes involuntary servitude8 6 or that it violates due process, 7 the Ninth Amendment, 8 or the equal protection
clause.8 9 In one novel case, United States v. Thomason,9 ° the appellant asserted that the Selective Service law violates the federal constitution in at least seven areas: (1) the President lacks authority to
make rules for the regulation of the armed services; (2) conscription
abridges the right to trial by jury; (3) the military rank system constitutes a title by nobility; (4) conscription violates the establishment
and free exercise of religion provisions; 9 (5) compulsory service
abridges freedom of speech and assembly; (6) it denies the right of
habeas corpus; and (7) it requires a religious test as a qualification for
public office. The court rejected all of these assertions. The form
which is required to be submitted in order to request conscientious objector status has also been challenged as "generally confusing" 92 and as
93
misleading because of its frequent reference to the word "religious".
Neither of these challenges, however, have been upheld.
Several Ninth Circuit litigants have, without success, attempted
to use as a defense the fact that the draft board members who decided
their case were not all qualified to sit on the board. Until recently the
regulations provided that all board members should reside within the
86. United States v. Lumsden, 449 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Gidmark, 440 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1971).
87. United States v. Lumsden, 449 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1971). Two cases held
that a registrant was not denied due process if his board refused to allow anyone but
the registrant to speak on his behalf at a personal appearance. United States v.
Tigerman, 456 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. De Acetis, 441 F.2d
592 (9th Cir. 1971). 50 United States Code Appendix section 471a(b) (2) (Supp.
1972) now provides: "Subject to reasonable limitations on the number of witnesses
and the total time allotted to each registrant, each registrant shall have the right to
present witnesses on his behalf before the local board."
88. United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Farrell, 443 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1971).
89. United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1971).
90. 444 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1971).
91. This argument was also rejected in United States v. Pryor, 448 F.2d 1273
(9th Cir. 1971).
92. United States. v. Thompson, 443 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1971).
93. United States v. Brunges, 450 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Yoha, 445 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1971). In Yoha the registrant had twice requested the
form but he had never returned it to his board. He claimed that since the form continuously uses the word "religious", he had been erroneously led to believe that
there was no possibility for his nonreligious conscientious beliefs to qualify him for
conscientious objector status. The court dismissed the registrant's argument, saying
that Yoha was not misled and that a board may properly inquire whether "religion"
is the basis for the claim. In Brunges the registrant claimed that the question on the
form concerning his belief in a Supreme Being caused him not to return the form;
simply because he did not believe in the orthodox concept of a Supreme Being. The
court relied on Yoha to refuse relief on the basis of this argument.
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same jurisdiction as those registrants with whom they deal.14 However,
the court has consistently held that the local board does not lose jurisdiction over the registrant merely because a panel member does not live in
the same jurisdiction.9" Further, the fact that a registrant's induction
order has been signed by a member of a draft board panel other than
the panel to which his classification had been assigned does not, without evidence that the signing member actually participated in the decision, make the order invalid.96
In a recent case, however, the court reversed a conviction for
draft evasion on the basis that the registrant had been classified by a
group smaller than a quorum, and concluded "[t]he classification was
therefore invalid and cannot support the order of induction."97 On the
other hand, the court upheld a classification of I-A by a board composed of only two members instead of the required minimum of three,9"
on the basis that both members had voted for the I-A classification
and the registrant would have been classified I-A even if there had
been three members. 99
As a general rule, a local board must state its reasons for denying
a requested classification if the registrant has presented a prima facie
claim therefor. 10 0 The Ninth Circuit has explained this requirement
as follows: "The purpose of requiring a statement of reasons for the
action of a selective service board is to permit adequate judicial review."''
However, in the recent case of United States v. Stickler,' °2
94. 32 Fed. Reg. 9787 (1967), as amended, 32 C.F.R. § 1604.52 (1972).
95. United States v. Lewis, 448 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Bloom, 444 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Nadeau, 442 F.2d 362
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stacey, 441 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1971).
96. United States v. Tigerman, 456 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1972).
97. United States v. Stinson, 450 F.2d 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1971).
98. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.52(a) (1971).
99. United States v. Schmall, 452 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1971). Another question
concerning a local board's jurisdiction was presented in United States v. Jenson,
450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1971). In Jenson the court held that a board has jurisdiction to continue issuing induction orders even though a criminal charge has been
filed and the registrant arraigned for refusal to report for induction.
100. United States v. Stickler, 452 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Wilson, 452 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Fraley, 451 F.2d 1307 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Buckley, 451 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Ward, 445 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Soranno, 442 F.2d
1350 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Molus, 440 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Hoffman, 439 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Baray, 445 F.2d
949 (dictum) (9th Cir. 1971). An exact statement of the reason for denial is not required since such a requirement would place an "intolerable burden" on the boards,
consisting largely of laymen. United States v. Wilson, 452 F.2d 529, 532 (9th
Cir. 1971).
101. United States v. Stickler, 452 F.2d 907, 908 (9th Cir. 1971).
102. Id.
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the court held that failure of the local board to state reasons for denial
of a classification was not always enough to form a complete defense
to criminal prosecution of the registrant. In Stickler the registrant had
requested conscientious objector status. The local board denied his
request without stating a reason. The appeal board affirmed the action
of the local board on the basis that the record "is insufficient to establish a deeply held belief and that the file of this registrant does not
sufficiently demonstrate his sincerity to justify placement in Class
I-O. ' ' 103 The registrant defended his refusal to report for induction on
the ground that the local board erred when it failed to state a reason
for denial of the registrant's claim. The court held that though the
local board had erred in not stating reasons for denial of the registrant's request, the error had been cured by the de novo review and
statement of reasons for denial of the requested deferment by the registrant's appeal board.
The latter board reviewed appellant's entire original file anew, including his letters. The action or inaction of the local board did
not control or limit the action of the appeal board . . . [And,
that he was prejmost importantly, the appellant] made no showing
04
udiced in any way in presenting his appeal.'
The appeal board must state its reason for denial of the deferment if the local board's reason is ambiguous' 01 or if the local board
has stated more than one reason for denial.'0 6 On the other hand, if
the registrant has not presented a prima facie claim, the failure of the
board to state its reason for denial does not invalidate the induction
07
order.1
103. Id. at 910.
104. Id. at 909.
105. In United States v. Fraley, 451 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1971), the local board's
reason was ambiguous and the appeal board stated no reason for denial. The court
reversed the registrant's conviction, stating that "the appeal board as well as the local
board [must] state its reasons for denial of a conscientious objector claim where the
application therefore is prima facie sufficient, unless the appeal board's reasons can be
determined from the .agency record with reasonable certainty." Id. at 1308, quoting
United States v. Kember, 437 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
923 (1971). Even if the local board's reason was adopted by implication, it was
apparently too ambiguous and could not be considered to apprise the registrant with
reasonable certainty.
106. See Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 250, 252 n.3 (9th Cir. 1971). But see
United States v. Buckley, 451 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1971), where the local board denied
the registrant conscientious objector status for what was apparently more than one reason and the appeal board agreed without stating a reason. Despite the fact that an
appeal board must state its reason for denial if the local board has stated more than
one reason, the court upheld the conviction. It said that the local board's statements
added up to one reason for denial (insincerity) and that the board had adopted this
reason by implication.
107. United States v. Preston, 445 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1971).
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In a few cases, the registrant has attempted to utilize as a defense to criminal charges the fact that the board had erroneously denied
his request for an appeal from a classification. Since the regulations
provide that all registrants are entitled to an appeal under proper request,10 8 failure to grant the registrant an appeal is a complete defense.
In United States v. Schmall °9 the registrant relied on just such an
error, and his conviction was reversed. In Schmall the registrant had
requested a student deferment on August 21, 1967. On January 25,
1968, the board had classified him I-A. On February 22, 1968, the
board received another request from the registrant asking for a student
deferment. The board took no action on the second request and continued the registrant in the I-A classification. Subsequently, an order
for induction was issued and the registrant was convicted for failure to
report for induction. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court reasoned that the second request for a student deferment should have
been considered by the board as a request for an appeal from the denial
of deferment.
The regulations provide that a notice of appeal "need not be in
any particular form" and "shall be liberally construed in favor of
the person filing the notice so as to permit the appeal." 32 C.F.R.
§ 1626.11(a).''
108. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.11 (1972).
109. 452 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1971).
110. Id. at 469. The court went on to say: "A related Operation Memorandum
issued by the California headquarters of the Selective Service System on April 8,
1964, provides:
'If a local board receives within the time to appeal a letter from the registrant.
expressing dissatisfaction with the classification, that letter should be regarded as a
letter of appeal.
'In short, any doubt whether an appeal is intended if the letter is filed within the
period allowed for an appeal, should be resolved in favor of the appeal.
'It is needless to point out that a registrant could successfully claim erroneous
induction if an appeal taken by him is not acted upon by the appeal board.'
Here the form submitted by appellant within the allotted appeal period stated,
'I am pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college . . . and do hereby request that I be granted an undergraduate student deferment in Class I1-S.' The local
board could not reasonably take the notice at its face value as a request for student
deferment and nothing more. Obviously it was a reaction to the board's order
rejecting just such a request only six days before. There was nothing to indicate that
the facts upon which appellant based his claim had changed in any way. The certificate from appellant's college confirming his admission and satisfactory pursuit of a
full-time course of instruction was very recent: it was dated January 3, 1968, and was
received by the board January 8.
The only possible message appellant could have meant to convey by the notice
was that he was dissatisfied with the board's order rejecting his claim for student
deferment and classifying him I-A, and that he wished to have it reviewed. Under the
Selective Service System's own policy of liberal interpretation, this should have been
enough to alert the board to forward the file to the State Appeal Board. Id. at 470.
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Another good defense to a prosecution for refusing to submit to
induction is a showing that the classification by the draft board was
erroneous, since only those who are correctly classified I-A can be
drafted.:"' An error in classification has been held to be no defense
to a registrant's refusal to submit to a physical examination. 1 2 However, in a recent case, United States v. Hayden,"' the court excused
the failure of the registrant to report for a physical. The registrant in
Hayden had asked for and been denied conscientious objector status.
He later had refused to submit to induction and had been charged
with willful failure to report for induction. The district court found
the registrant not guilty, declaring that a reasonable man could not
have found that he was not entitled to conscientious objector status
and that the draft board's classification was therefore erroneous. Despite this judicial determination, the local draft board continued the
registrant's I-A classification; and when he failed to report for a physical, he was declared delinquent and ordered to report for priority induction. The registrant again refused induction and was convicted by
the district court for failing to submit to induction and failing to report
for a physical as ordered. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction
for refusing induction on the basis that an induction order may not be
accelerated because of delinquency." 4 The government had contended
that the error in accelerating induction should not have any effect
upon the conviction for failing to report for a physical. On the basis
of the entire record, however, the court felt that the registrant should
have initially been granted conscientious objector status, and on this
basis, he was entitled to the rights and benefits of such status. Since
the regulations provide that anyone classified as a conscientious objector
who fails to submit to a physical examination shall be treated as though
he had taken and passed the examination," 5 the court concluded that
the registrant could not therefore be convicted for failure to report for
a physical-he was to be deemed to have taken and passed the examination. 1
111. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.1, 1631.7(a) (1972).
112. United States v. Kohls, 441 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1971) (dictum);
United States v. Zmuda, 423 F.2d 757, 759 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
113. 445 F.2d 1365 (9thCir. 1971).
114. Id. at 1369. This rule, established by the Supreme Court in Gutknecht v.
United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970), was given retroactive application by Hayden.
115. 32 C.F.R. § 1660.20(a) (1971).
116. Obviously, this defense for a charge of failure to report for a physical would
be available to a very limited number of defendants. In fact, in United States v. De
La Parra, 445 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1971), the court indicated that Hayden was a
decision highly influenced by the court's having found "punitive aspects" in the actions of the local board. The court has also stated that entitlement to a I-Y classification would not excuse a failure to report for a physical. United States v. Kohls,
441 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1971) (dictum).
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Another regulation," 17 which places a duty upon the local board
to either induct a registrant within a maximum of 120 days or to
cancel his order to report for induction, has been at issue in several
of the recent cases." 8 The court has held that the 120-day limitation
does not apply when the induction of the registrant is postponed by
the state director of selective service, since he "may, for good cause, at
anytime after the issuance of an Order to Report for Induction . . .
postpone the induction of a registrant until such time as he may deem
advisable.""' 9 Of course, the primary reason for requiring the induction of the registrant within 120 days after the order for induction has
been issued is that a registrant is limited in obtaining a change in
classification after an induction notice has been mailed, 2 ° and
"[k]eeping a registrant in a position of such disadvantage for an
indefinite period of time cannot be permitted . ... ,,12
The mere
fact that there has been a delay of more than 120 days does not mean
the order is cancelled, however; there must be a 120-day delay resulting from the actions of the board.'2 2 Further, a postponement of an
induction order ",until further notice" has been held not to be a can23
cellation when the delay did not exceed 120 days.'
In the complex case of United States v. Munsen, 21 a criminal
conviction was ultimately reversed on the basis of this 120-day requirement. The registrant in Munsen was originally ordered to report for
induction in October 1967. After his request for permission to make
a merchant marine voyage before induction was refused by the local
draft board, the registrant went on the voyage anyway. During his
absence, the board received information that the registrant had married and that his wife was pregnant. The registrant returned to the
country in March of 1968, and received an order to report for induction on September 18, 1968. On September 16, two days before
he was scheduled to report for induction, the registrant asked for the
form for conscientious objector status. On September 18, 1968, the
board postponed his induction-not because of any prior requests of
the registrant but rather to permit investigation of a recently filed
117. 32 C.F.R. § 1632.2 (1972).
118. United States v. Jenson, 450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Malatesta, 447 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. White, 447 F.2d 1124
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Longo, 445 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Munsen, 443 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stacey, 441 F.2d

508 (9th Cir. 1971).
119.
120.
121.
122.

United States v. Jenson, 450 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1971).
See notes 39-60 & accompanying text supra.
United States v. Munsen, 443 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1971).
United States v. Malatesta, 447 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1971).

123.

United States v. Stacey, 441 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1971).

124.

443 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1971).
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charge for possession of marijuana. On October 15, 1968, the state
director of selective service authorized a thirty-day postponement to allow the registrant to perfect his conscientious objector claim. The
registrant failed to file the required form, and was again ordered to

report for induction. On April 29, 1969, the registrant appeared but
refused to submit to induction, and he was convicted by the district

court. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court noted that since 18
months had passed between the first notice of induction and the date

the registrant had refused induction, the conviction of the registrant
was erroneous because of the regulation requiring action be taken within 120 days. The court emphasized that the registrant was under severe procedural restrictions during the 18 month period his induction
was pending,'25 and that he might otherwise have pursued a deferment
on the basis of his marriage and dependent child. The court remarked:
The first five months of the 18 month delay were consumed by
Munsen's unauthorized absence from this country. He has no
standing to complain about this portion of the delay. Thereafter,
however, the state director, at the request of the local board, reviewed the file and chose to order that Munsen be reprocessed for
induction rather than criminally prosecuted.[ 126] At
this point,
127
Munsen had a right. . . not to be held "in limbo.'
The court concluded that though a portion of the remaining period of
delay may have been attributable to the registrant's actions, clearly
more than 120 days of the delay had been caused simply by "adminis125. See notes 39-60 & accompanying text supra.
126. The importance of this choice was discussed in dictum in the case of United
States v. White, 447 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1971). There the registrant had first been
ordered to report for induction on June 19, 1968. He had failed to appear at that
time as well as at a subsequent induction date. He was then ordered to report on
June 10, 1969. On June 2 he filed the required form for conscientious objector status
and then refused to submit to induction on June 10. On July 24 the United States
Attorney asked the board to consider the registrant's conscientious objector claim.
After considerable delay, the board interviewed him; after the interview, the board decided not to reopen his classification but rather to order him to report on September 1,
1970. He reported and refused to submit. Although the registrant did not raise the
issue on appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that more than 120 days had passed between
the date of the first induction order (June 19, 1968) and the date that the registrant
refused to submit (September 1, 1970). The court distinguished the Munsen case
because Munsen had willingly reported to the induction center; and his induction had
been held in abeyance pending investigation of his fitness for service because of a
marijuana charge. "Unlike [Munsen] whose induction [was] officially held in
abeyance, [White] was under the 'continuing duty' (of one who has already disobeyed)
to report for and submit to induction. . . . We hold that one who has willfully
failed to appear for or refused to submit to induction when validly ordered to do so
cannot therefore complain of mere administrative delay." Id. at 1126-27.
127. United States v. Munsen, 443 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1971).
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trative inertia.""' 8 The decision in Munsen clarifies to some extent
the rules regarding the effect of administrative delay as a defense to
conviction for failure to report for induction. For administrative delay
to provide a defense, however, a registrant must show not only that
he willingly reported for induction, 129 but also that his induction was
officially held30 in abeyance more than 120 days for the benefit of the
government.
Convictions for violating the Selective Service Act have also
been challenged on the basis that the draft board violated the "order of
call" regulation; 13 ' however, such challenges have been successful only
rarely. In United States v. Smith"12 a registrant appealed his conviction on the ground that there were at least twelve men who should
have been called for induction before he was, and since only five were
called at the date he refused induction, his conviction for refusing induction should be reversed. At the time the registrant received his order for induction, local boards were required to call "the oldest registrants"' who were (1) I-A or I-A-O, (2) had been found acceptable
for military service and (3) had been mailed a Statement of Acceptability . . . at least 21 days prior to the date of induction.""' 4

The

registrant showed that all twelve of the registrants the board failed
to call before him were, in fact, older than he, had been classified
I-A at the date registrant refused induction, and had been found acceptable for military service. In so doing, the registrant raised sufficient doubt as to the propriety of the order of call.
Because "the order of call affects registrant's substantial rights,"" 5
the burden of proof of showing the propriety of the order of call
shifted to the government. The government conceded that one of the
twelve should have been called before the registrant. However, the
government asserted that it met its burden of proof as to the other
eleven simply by having the secretary of the registrant's local board
testify at the trial that none of those eleven had been mailed a state128.
129.

Id.
See note 126 supra.

130.

United States v. White, 447 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1971)

131.

32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1971).

(dictum).

United States v. Howells, 452 F.2d 1182 (9th

Cir. 1971); United States v. Munoz, 451 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Simon, 448 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 443 F.2d 1278 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Thompson, 443 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Lane, 442 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1971).
132. 443 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1971).

133.

Since 1970, registrants with the lowest lottery numbers, rather than the

oldest among eligible candidates are drafted first.
134. 443 F.2d at 1279.
135. Id.

32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1972).
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ment of acceptability at least twenty-one days before the date of the
registrant's scheduled induction.
The Ninth Circuit said that
[a] registrant may rely upon improper processing of higher priority registrants in defending a criminal prosecution if he can establish (1) that his local board violated a specific regulation, and
higher
(2) that the result was to delay significantly the time when
priority registrants became fully acceptable for induction.' 38
The court rejected the contention that the government had fulfilled
its burden of proof and looked beyond the secretary's testimony to see
if any regulations had been violated. The court determined that the
board had twice violated the regulation which states that a registrant's
file must be sent to the appeal board within five days after the lapse
of time for appeal.' 37 Because of this failure, two registrants had not
been sent their statements of acceptability when they should have.
However, since the board erred only in the case of three men, and
was the oldest of the five called, his
since the registrant in question
38
conviction was not reversed..
When a registrant's induction has been postponed, the propriety
of the order of call is determined with reference to the date he was
originally scheduled for induction rather than the date he was actually
inducted. 3 9 However, if the registrant has previously failed to report,
140
there is no need to demonstrate the propriety of the order of call.
Since January, 1970, the order of call has been determined by an
This random sequence method of call itself
annual draft lottery.1"
4
of lottery numbers will not likely eliminate
use
The
upheld.
has been
of the order of call, since the only
propriety
the
litigation involving
real change had been to substitute the lowest lottery number for the
oldest registrant.
136. Id. at 1280.
137. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.14 (1971).
138. See notes 173-79 & accompanying text infra.
139. United States v. Lane, 442 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1971). The registrant was
ordered to report for induction on July 8; he asked the board for conscientious objector status and the board postponed the induction while considering his claim. He
was then ordered to report for induction on October 1, but he failed to do so. He
claimed that he was called out of order from among those eligible to be drafted in
October. The court said that the July order of call and not the October order of call
was determinative. The reason is that, during the period of postponement, the
registrant could not have been inducted, yet the original order remained valid. When
the postponement ended, the board did not issue a new order; instead it was simply
informing the registrant of a new date to report for induction.
140. United States v. Simon, 448 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1971).
141. See note 133 supra.
142. United States v. Mumoz, 451 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Thompson, 443 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Several cases have involved the question of whether the government actually sustained its burden of proving that the registrant willfully violated the Selective Service Act.' 4 3 The Ninth Circuit has ruled
that the government need only show the registrant was aware of his
legal obligation and possessed a deliberate intent not to comply. 44
Evidence of registrant's good faith in challenging a law he believed
wrong is not even admissible;1 45 nor is the fact that a registrant was
unaware of the specific penalties at the time he violated the Selective
Service Act. 4 In the past year the Ninth Circuit even upheld a conviction in which the only evidence presented by the 7government was
14
a certified copy of the registrant's selective service file.
Major Obstacles to a Reversal of Conviction
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A conviction for violation of the Selective Service Act will normally be upheld, even though it is conceded that the local board erred
in classification of the registrant, where the registrant failed to first
exhaust his administrative remedies. The principle underlying this policy is fundamental to administrative law-the agency involved is generally the most experienced and best equipped body in its specialized
area, and a court of law should refrain from intervention in matters an
agency could resolve.' 48 A party should thus make full utilization of
143. United States v. De Arman, 453 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971) (mutilating and
destroying a draft card); United States v. Buckley, 452 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1971)
(failure to advise board of mailing address); United States v. Foreman, 452 F.2d 336
(9th Cir. 1971) (failure to register); United States v. Wendt, 452 F.2d 679 (9th
Cir. 1971) (refusal to submit to induction); United States v. Pen, 451 F.2d 554 (9th
Cir. 1971) (failure to report for alternate service); United States v. Hedges, 449 F.2d
1289 (9th Cir. 1971) (failure to advise board of mailing address); United States v.
Lewis, 448 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusal to submit to induction); United States
v. Stom, 448 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Thompson,
443 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Wilkinson, 443 F.2d 15 (9th
Cir. 1971) (same); United States v. Day, 442 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1971) (same).
144. United States v. Day, 442 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1971).
145. Id.
146. United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1971).
147. United States v. Thompson, 443 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1971).
Relying on
Thompson in a subsequent case, the court said that a letter from an official at the
induction center which stated that the registrant had refused to submit to induction was
admissible at trial since it was a part of the regisrtran's file. United States v. Wendt,
452 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1971).
148. For one expression of the exhaustion doctrine see McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479 (1971). "The task for the courts, in deciding the applicability of the
exhaustion doctrine to the circumstances of a particular case, is to ask 'whether allowing all similarly situated registrants to bypass [the administrative avenue in question]
would seriously impair the Selective Service System's ability to perform its functions.'"
Id. at 484.
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appealing to a court of law, except in exthe agency remedies before
149
traordinary circumstances.
Under this so-called "exhaustion doctrine," the registrant is required to appeal to the appeal board any adverse classification decision
made by his local board or he will be foreclosed from later attacking
the determination. However, if the registrant bases a court challenge
of his board's actions on grounds other than error in classification, appeal of the registrant's I-A classification is not deemed necessary. 150
Two United States Supreme Court cases, McGee v. United States 5 '
and McKart v. United States, 52 best demonstrate the operation of the
exhaustion principle in selective service law.
McGee exemplifies the most typical application of the exhaustion
doctrine. There the registrant submitted the required form for conscientious objector status in February 1966, while he still possessed a
student deferment. The board advised him that the conscientious objector claim would not be considered until the student deferment expired. When registrant McGee graduated in June 1967, the board
sent him a "current information questionnaire" which he returned unanswered. In September 1967 the board considered and rejected the
prior filed conscientious objector request and reclassified him I-A. The
registrant requested neither a personal appearance before the local
board nor review by the appeal board. He failed to report for a physical, and though he did show up on his induction date, he refused to
submit to induction.
At his trial, the registrant argued that the board had erred in
classifying him I-A instead of granting him conscientious objector status. The trial court held that the defense of incorrect classification
was barred because the registrant had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available for correction of such an error. The Supreme Court agreed, even though it conceded that McGee had presented the board with a prima facie case for conscientious objector
status.

53

Petitioner's dual failure to exhaust-his failure either to secure a
personal appearance or to take an administrative appeal-implicates decisively the policies served by the exhaustion requirement,
especially the purpose of ensuring that the Selective Service Sys149. E.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Munsen, 443 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1971). The
fact that the registrant had not appealed his I-A classification did not prevent him
from challenging the board's action which resulted in an illegal delay. See notes
124-28 & accompanying text supra.
151. 402 U.S. 479 (1971).

152. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
153.

402 U.S. 479 (1971).
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tem have full opportunity to "make a factual record" and "apply
its expertise" in relation to a registrant's claim. When a claim
to exemption depends ultimately on the careful gathering and
analysis of relevant facts, the interest in full airing of the facts
within the administrative system is prominent, and as the Court of
Appeals noted, the exhaustion requirement "cannot properly be
limited to those persons whose claim would fail in court anyway."l, 4

In McGee the court explained that any other rule would make
administration almost intolerable and certainly less effective. The court
concluded that the determination as to propriety of granting McGee
conscientious objector status depended -ultimately on the careful gathering and analysis of relevant facts; since the ability of the Selective
Service System to perform its functions might be seriously impaired if
a registrant were not required to exhaust his administrative remedies
in this type of situation, the court affirmed McGee's conviction.
United States v. McKart 5 represents a clear exception to the
exhaustion doctrine. Shortly after his 18th birthday registrant McKart
registered with the draft and indicated on the questionnaire that he
was a sole surviving son. In 1963 the board classified him I-A and
he didn't appeal. In 1964 he chose not to report for a physical nor
for induction. Instead he wrote his local board a letter stating that
the Selective Service System violated his beliefs and he refused to cooperate with it. His board sent him the required form to apply for
conscientious objector status and also asked for information as to whether he was a sole surviving son. The registrant returned a blank conscientious objector form and informed the board that he had no brothers or sisters and that his father had been killed in World War II.
However, he did not ask for a different classification.
McKart's board, on its own initiative, classified him IV-A, as a
sole surviving son. He remained in this classification for almost two
years (until February 1966) when the board, upon learning of the
death of McKart's mother, classified him I-A. The registrant did not
appeal this classification, and he failed to report for induction when
subsequently ordered to do so.
At the trial, he attempted to defend his refusal to report on the
ground that he was still entitled to a IV-A classification. The trial
court refused to consider such an argument since the registrant had
not appealed his I-A classification and thus had not exhausted his
administrative remedies.
The Supreme Court said that this case presented "special circumstances," so that the registrant was not required to exhaust his ad154.
155.

Id. at 489-490.
395 U.S. 185 (1969).
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ministrative remedies before a court would review his classification.
The court reasoned that the question of whether McKart's mother's
death terminated his right to a IV-A classification was really a matter
of interpretation of law, not administrative procedure, hence the judiciary was at least equally adept as the draft board in this area. In
other words, this was not the type of determination for which the
Selective Service System is especially qualified. There was no reason
to require the registrant to appeal the classification to the appeal board
rather than to the court. In conclusion, the court decided that McKart
remained entitled to a IV-A classification (on the merits) and his conviction was reversed.
In a number of its recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit has inyoked the exhaustion principle and refused to review the correctness
of a defendant's classification. 15 61 In United States v. Lopez1 57 the
board failed to notify a registrant of the availability of an appeals
agent. This notification should have accompanied the notice to the
registrant that he had been classified I-A.1 58 The registrant subsequently refused to report for induction, and he was convicted. On
appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the registrant claimed that the I-A
classification was erroneous, and that the error of the board in failing
to notify him of the appeal procedure should excuse his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies through an administrative appeal.
The court distinguished a Fourth Circuit decision, 159 which had held
that a board's failure to give notice of the availability of an appeals
agent presented "exceptional circumstances." The court noted that,
unlike the Fourth Circuit case, the registrant had failed to present the
local board with any evidence that he might be entitled to a classification other than I-A. Therefore, the court concluded that ordinary
rules would apply and affirmed the registrant's conviction.
In only one recent decision did the Ninth Circuit excuse a registrant from the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
United States v. Hayden.1 60 The court found that the "special circumstances" present in the case did not require that the "exhaustion doctrine" be followed. The registrant had asked for conscientious ob156. United States v. Griggs, 451 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Lopez, 448 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Warren, 446 F.2d 568 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Longo, 445 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. McCaa, 442 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wolford, 442 F.2d 1352
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kohls, 441 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971); see
United States v. Baray, 445 F.2d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 1971) (dictum).
157. 448 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1971).
158. Local Board Memorandum No. 82 (1967) (rescinded 1970).
159. United States v. Davis, 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969).
160. 445 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1971).
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jector status but the local board had nevertheless classified him I-A.
The registrant refused to submit to induction; however, he was acquitted in the subsequent trial on the basis of the court's finding that no
reasonable man could disagree that the registrant's file evidenced the
facts needed for conscientious objector status.
Subsequent to the trial court decision, however, the board continued the registrant's I-A classification, and requested that the registrant appear for an interview in order "to develop further facts on
which [his] conscientious objector claim is based and the sincerity of
such claim."' 61 The registrant refused the interview, pointing out
to the board that a judge had already declared him entitled to conscientious objector status. The board treated the refusal of the registrant to appear for an interview as evidence of his lack of sincerity and
thus continued the I-A classification. The registrant had never appealed the classification by the draft board, and when he was again
ordered to report for induction, he refused. At a second trial, he was
convicted of failure to report for a physical and refusal to submit to
induction.
As previously discussed,' 62 the registrant's conviction was reversed
by the Ninth Circuit on the basis that the induction order was invalid
because it had been accelerated, and because the registrant should
have been accorded classification as a conscientious objector. In a
petition for rehearing, the government argued that the court should
not have considered whether the registrant was entitled to the rights
of one classified as a conscientious objector, since the registrant had
never attempted to obtain administrative review of his I-A classification. The court denied a rehearing, stating:
Here, we do not deal with a registrant who, having made out a
prima facie case, refuses to allow to the Board an inquiry into his
sincerity. [This] is a registrant whose sincerity has been attested
by a federal District Court, after a trial in which the very issues
being litigated herein were resolved in [the registrant's] favor
... . Here, [the registrant's] Board sought to take advantage of
him, and to ignore the courts. 63
Scope of Judicial Review
Even though a registrant may have exhausted his administrative
remedies and thus complied with the "exhaustion doctrine," judicial
review of his local board's actions is still quite limited. This is evidenced most often in cases where the appellant attacks his conviction on
the basis that the local draft board wrongfully denied him conscientious
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1368.
See notes 113-16 & accompanying text supra.
445 F.2d 1365, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1971).
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objector status. Generally, the case will turn on the crucial factual issue of the sincerity of the registrant's beliefs, and unless the court
finds a clearly erroneous determination by the draft board in this regard, judicial relief will be denied. In other words, if there is a basis
in fact for the board's determination-more than "intention" or "feel"4
ing" on the part of the board-its action will be -upheld by the court;16
of course, if there is no basis in fact for the determination the conviction will be reversed. 6 5 As the Ninth Circuit has recently remarked,
"mere disbelief in the sincerity of a registrant, grounded on no objective evidence of insincerity, will not166suffice to deny a registrant an
exemption as a conscientious objector.'
In United States v. Andersen'6 7 the registrant had received both
student and occupational deferments until March 1969. On March 7,
1969, the registrant submitted the first evidence to the local board of
his conscientious objector beliefs. The registrant was subsequently
convicted for failing to report for induction. On appeal before the
Ninth Circuit the government argued that, since the registrant did not
seek conscientious objector status until his previous deferments had
been discontinued, this constituted sufficient evidence to show a lack
of sincerity and the conviction of the registrant should be allowed to
164. United States v. Wilson, 452 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Buckley, 451 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Tigerman, 456 F.2d 54 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Newton, 443 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. United States
v. Neckels, 451 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1971) (doubt as to the existence of medical disability).
165. United States v. Zaragoza, 449 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Andersen, 447 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hayden, 445 F.2d 1365
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ward, 445 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1971).
166. United States v. Andersen, 446 F.2d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1971), quoting
United States v. Hayden, 445 F.2d 1365, 1373 (9th Cir. 1971). However, the court
has held that factual inconsistencies material to an application for conscientious objector status will support an inference of insincerity. United States v. Tigerman,
456 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1972). An example of the type of record that will support a finding of insincerity is the case of United States v. Willson, 452 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1971). The record contained statements by the registrant expressing doubt
as to whether he would have refused induction during World War H or would refrain
from defending himself. He also stated that he would be willing to work in a defense plant as a civilian and that he helped the war effort by paying taxes. This
was sufficient to constitute a basis in fact for the board's denial on the ground of insincerity. A district court opinion, expressly adopted by the Ninth Circuit indicated
another judge's reasoning in such cases: "I am satisfied that, on the merits, the local
board had a basis in fact for the administrative denial of conscientious objector
status. The nature of [the registrant's] dealings with his local board, the political
rather than religious nature of his objections to war, his exaggerated claims to student status, and his frequent delays in reporting his change of address, all provide a
basis in fact for the finding of insincerity." United States v. Stickler, 452 F.2d 907
910 (9th Cir. 1971).
167. 447 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1971).
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stand. The court, however, reasoned that since the board had been
required to classify the registrant in the lowest class for which he was
eligible,16 8 and since "it would be improper to penalize [the registrant
himself] for failure to act with greater dispatch than the regulations
demanded,"' 169 the conviction should be reversed.
Administrative Regularity
A doctrine occasionally referred to by the Ninth Circuit in explaining the limited scope of judicial review in the selective service
cases is the doctrine of "administrative regularity."' 17 0 This doctrine
gives a presumption of administrative regularity to the board's actions,
and the registrant thus has the burden of overcoming that presumption
with sufficient proof of the irregular actions taken by the draft board.
A recent case, United States v. Neckels,17 1 will illustrate the effect of
the doctrine. The registrant claimed that his appeal of an unfavorable
classification to the appeal board could not have received adequate
consideration because of the large volume of cases the appeals board
had decided in a relatively short period of time. The court rejected the
argument in the following terms:
This presumption of regularity has been recognized and applied
by us to both local and 4ppeal board actions . . . . To prevail,
a registrant must do more than show that the appeal board reviewed a large number of cases in a limited period of time. This,
without
more, does not overcome the presumption of regularity.172
Prejudice Doctrine
Because of the voluminous regulations and local memoranda faced
by local draft boards, the courts do not impose a standard of error
free administration. Rather the courts evaluate the type of harm, if
any, caused to the individual registrant by any board error. In order
to use mistakes of the local draft board as a defense to a Selective Service Act violation, the registrant must demonstrate exactly how he was
prejudiced by the board's error,' 7 3 and unless such a prejudicial effect
168.

32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1972).

See notes 34-37 & accompanying text supra.

169. 447 F.2d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 1971). The court also expressed approval of
a Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. White, 421 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1969), that
failure to file an already matured claim could "be adequately explained by a registrant's concern for the effect such an action might have on his parents." 447 F.2d
at 1067.
170. United States v. Neckels, 451 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Carson, 449 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971).
171. 451 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1971).
172. Id. at 712.
173. United States v. Jenson, 450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court
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4
is shown, the registrant is not entitled to reversal of his conviction.17
175
United States v. Jenson provides a good example of the "prejudice"
doctrine. In Jenson the local board had ordered the registrant to report
for induction on August 23, 1969; the board had already postponed
several earlier orders. The registrant was in Europe when the order
was issued, and he apparently never received it. On November 25,
1969, the United States attorney filed a complaint charging the registrant with failure to comply with the draft board's order. On December 2, 1969, the registrant was arraigned, and at the same time the
local board issued a new order demanding that the registrant report
on December 8, 1969. The registrant appeared but refused to submit
to induction, and he was subsequently convicted for violating the order of December 2, 1969. On appeal, the registrant claimed that the
December 2, 1969, induction order was invalid since neither the United
States attorney nor the judge had informed the induction center that
they had no objection to the proposed induction.1 76 The court said
this would have been a good defense had the registrant been able 1to
77
show a prejudicial effect due to the failure to follow the regulation;
however, since no such prejudice was established the conviction was
affirmed.

held a registrant can rely on the fact that he was prejudiced by an erroneous violation
of a regulation even if the rule had been established solely for the benefit of the
government. But see United States v. Baray, 445 F.2d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1971).
174. United States v. Stickler, 452 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Schmall, 452 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wendt, 452 F.2d 679
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jack, 451 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Nobile, 451 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Stupke, 451 F.2d 997
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jensen, 450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Lopez, 448 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hand, 443 F.2d 826
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 443 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Lopez, 442 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Thomas, 442 F.2d
1259 (9th Cir. 1971).
175. 450 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1971).
176. This was required under Army Reg. 601-270 § 3-9(c)(3) (1969) which
provides: "Men who have filed and pending against them a criminal charge alleging
violation of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 may be processed for induction,
and inducted, if otherwise acceptable, upon receipt by the AFEES of a letter (furnished directly to the AFEES or through the Selective Service local board from the
U.S. Attorney concerned with the prosecution of registrant's case). . . ." (emphasis
added).
177. "All appellant established was that the letter reflecting these views apparently had not been written. The only possibility of prejudice to appellant from this
omission was that it may have contributed in some way to his refusal to submit to
induction-as it might, for example, if appellant was thereby deprived of an assurance
he would have had that the pending charges would be dismissed if he stepped forward. But there is nothing to indicate that appellants refusal to be inducted was
influenced in any way by the letter's absence. Under the regulation the letter would
have been addressed to the induction center, not to appellant. There is nothing to
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In United States v. Baray17 8 the registrant had been convicted of
failure to report for induction, and on appeal the registrant raised as
a defense that the local board had failed to provide an interview with
its medical advisor, despite a regulation requiring such an interview."7 9
The government claimed that this error by the board was not prejudicial since the registrant had been found acceptable for service at a
subsequent physical examination. The court, however, held that had
the registrant been given the opportunity to have a single doctor review
his medical condition, there might have been no necessity for the second physical examination. Thus, the court concluded that the board's
error had been prejudicial, and the conviction was reversed.
Conclusion
An attorney's approach to a specific case depends to a great extent upon the point in time that he is first consulted by the registrant.
If the registrant is knowledgable enough to consult his attorney at the
outset of the relationship btween a registrant and the local board, the
attorney's primary concern will be to see that the board is presented
indicate that appellant was aware that it had not been written when he chose to refuse induction. Indeed, the record strongly suggests that he was either unaware of
the omission or unconcerned by it. Appellant wrote to his board after his arraignment but before his refusal to be inducted. He stated that the order of December 2
was unlawful because he had been charged with failure to report before the order was
served upon him, but he did not rely in any way upon the absence of the United
States Attorney's letter. 450 F.2d at 1260. Another example of a situation where
the board violated a regulation but the registrant was not prejudiced is United States v.
Smith, 443 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1971). There the registrant was able to show
that his board erred when it failed to call three other registrants who preceded
Smith in the order of call. Yet this did not result in an acquittal, since five registrants were called the day he refused to submit and he was the oldest of the five.
Smith was not "prejudiced" since he would have been included in that 5-man draft
call anyway, regardless of board error. The prejudice principle is broad enough to
include many other situations. For example, a registrant who possesses a student
deferment is not prejudiced when he is not allowed an appeal on his rejected conscientious objector claim. United States v. Kohls, 441 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1971).
He cam simply raise the conscientious objector claim again when his student deferment expires. This same reasoning would apply to other deferments as well. And
the registrant is not prejudiced when his board delays in reclassifying him after his
deferment expires, since he remains deferred throughout the period prior to such
re-classification. Id.
178. 445 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1971).
179. 32 C.F.R. § 1628.2 (1972), which provides: "Whenever the local board is
of the opinion that a registrant in Class I-A, Class I-A-O, or Class 1-0 has one or
more of the disqualifying medical conditions or physical defects which appear in the
list described in § 1628.1, it may order the registrant to present himself for medical
At the time the board failed to give
interview at a specified time and place .......
Baray a medical interview, the duty to do so was mandatory rather than discretionary.
445 F.2d at 953 n.4.
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with prima facie evidence of any deferments to which the registrant
might be entitled. If the requested deferment is denied by the local
board, the attorney should file an appeal with the appeals board in
order to comply with the "exhaustion doctrine." Taking the case to
the appeals board will guarantee the client an opportunity to use any
error in classification by the draft board as a defense at a trial for
violation of the Selective Service Act; failure to appeal, on the other
hand, would preclude this defense, unless the registrant could show
the presence of special circumstances.
If the registrant has already received an induction notice, the possibilities of obtaining a change of classification are more remote. Not
only must the registrant present a prima facie case for a deferment;
he must also make a prima facie showing that the change in status
warranting such deferment resulted from circumstances beyond the
registrant's own control. The Ehlert case has conclusively determined
that late crystallization of conscientious objector beliefs is not a situation beyond the registrant's control. However, it must still be kept in
mind that if the board did reopen the registrant's classification, then the
board must bear the burden of proving that the registrant was not
entitled to the deferment on the merits.
Often an attorney will not be consulted until such time as the registrant faces criminal prosecution for violation of the Selective Service
Act. At this point the likelihood of any success turns entirely on the
showing of administrative errors. Unlike most criminal prosecutions,
the defendant-and not the government-bears the burden of proof
as to most issues. For example, the registrant must not only demonstrate that the local board committed an administrative error, but must
also show that this mistake was prejudicial. With very rare exceptions,
errors in classification will not even be considered by the court unless
the registrant has exhausted his administrative remedies. Even if the
classification is reviewed, the court will uphold the board if there exists
some basis in fact for its determination.
Occasionally, an attorney will be consulted by someone already in
the service who seeks release on the basis that he should not have
been drafted, or now alleges he is a conscientious objector. The proper
method for the lawyer to obtain release for such an individual is by
petition for a writ of habeas cropus. If it can be established that the
client should not have been drafted, he will be entitled to release from
active service. If the registrant had filed the proper application for
conscientious objector status, then he is entitled to a forum to express
his beliefs. The registrant is entitled to a hearing regarding his beliefs
even if his beliefs crystallized prior to induction but after receipt of
his induction notice. Of course, the serviceman would not be entitled
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to a forum if his beliefs had matured prior to receipt of his induction
orders, because his failure to inform the local draft board is conclusive.
The burden here, too, is cast upon the petitioner, since the court will
be compelled to uphold the denial of conscientious objector status if
there is a basis in fact for the services's decision.
The task of a selective service attorney is made somewhat more
difficult because of the inflexibility of the administrative rules of the
Selective Service System. In addition, the draft lawyer is often handicapped because the client has waited too long to follow the most beneficial procedure. For these reasons, the selective service attorney must
have an absolute mastery of the intricate details and time limitations
imposed by statute and administrative rulings; he can afford precious
little error.
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